Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data. Salanie, Bernard. [Theorie des contrats. English]. The economics of contracts: primer / Bernard Salanie. By Bernard Salanié; Abstract: The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic. The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. Article · January with 99 Reads. Cite this publication. Bernard Salanie at Columbia University. Bernard Salanie.

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Email address for updates. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6.

It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics.

Journal of the Econometric Society, This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: Journal of Applied Econometrics 17 1, The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries.


Articles 1—20 Show more. This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Marc Henry Professor of Economics Verified email at psu.

Bernard Salanie – Google Scholar Citations

The Economics of Contracts: Verified email at columbia. Their combined citations are counted only for the first article.

Amit Gandhi University of Pennsylvania Verified email at upenn. New articles related to this author’s research. Koen Jochmans University of Cambridge Verified email at cam.

EconPapers: The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd Edition, vol 1

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Get my own profile Cited by View all All Since Citations h-index 39 27 economifs 69 For the second edition, major changes have been made to berrnard 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics.


Estimation of multi-market fix-price models: The economics of contracts: Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: My profile My library Metrics Alerts.

Does fertility respond to financial incentives?

The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd Edition, vol 1

Long-term, short-term and renegotiation: The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. Estimating preferences under risk: Articles Cited by Co-authors. The system can’t perform the operation now. Professor of Economics, Columbia University.

This “Cited by” count includes citations to the following articles in Scholar. New articles by this author. Title Cited by Year The economics ov contracts: The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own.