Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data. Salanie, Bernard. [Theorie des contrats. English]. The economics of contracts: primer / Bernard Salanie. By Bernard Salanié; Abstract: The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic. The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. Article · January with 99 Reads. Cite this publication. Bernard Salanie at Columbia University. Bernard Salanie.

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The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd Edition, vol 1

Verified email at columbia. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: Koen Jochmans University of Cambridge Verified email at cam. This “Cited by” count includes citations to the following articles in Scholar. D86 C70 search for similar items in EconPapers Date: Here is how to contribute.

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The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. My profile My library Metrics Alerts. New citations to this author. Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: The following cotnracts are merged in Scholar.


EconPapers: The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd Edition, vol 1

An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Should more risk-averse agents exert more effort? Amit Gandhi University of Pennsylvania Verified email at upenn. Their combined citations are counted only for the first article. Estimation of multi-market fix-price models: Journal of Political Bsrnard 3, Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Does fertility respond to financial incentives?

The system can’t perform the operation now. Get my own profile Cited by View all All Since Citations h-index 39 27 iindex 69 Estimating preferences under risk: Long-term, short-term and renegotiation: Journal of the Econometric Society, For the second edition, contdacts changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics.


The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. Journal of Applied Econometrics 17 1, The economics of contracts: The goal is to give readers bbernard tools to understand the basic models and create their own.

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This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The Economics of Contracts: It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics.

Marc Henry Professor of Economics Verified email at psu. New articles related to this author’s research.

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